Moral Relativity in America

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Ensuring Judicial Accountability For State Judges David Barton

The Constitution originally organized the judiciary in a manner providing for appointed judges, serving for the duration of "good behavior" (Art. III, Sec. 1, Par. 1). That appointed system performed admirably while a common value system was embraced by the nation. (For example, even though Declaration signers Benjamin Franklin and the Rev. Dr. John Witherspoon held divergent religious views, there were few differences in their governmental philosophy or approach to common cultural values.) The success of the appointed system was further enhanced by the fact that the judiciary did not view itself as a super-legislature; policy-making was anathema to that branch, and it was extremely unusual for the judiciary to strike down any act of the legislature. As a supreme court explained in 1838:

The Court, therefore, from its respect for the Legislature - the immediate representation of that sovereign power [the people] whose will created and can at pleasure change the Constitution itself - will ever strive to sustain and not annul its [the Legislature's] expressed determination. . . . [A]nd whenever the people become dissatisfied with its operation, they have only to will its abrogation or modification and let their voice be heard through the legitimate channel, and it will be done. But until they wish it, let no branch of the government - and least of all the Judiciary - undertake to interfere with it. [1] (emphasis added)

Most judges today no longer embrace this view. Consequently, State policies on issues from education to criminal justice, from religious expressions to moral legislation, from financing to health now stem more frequently from judicial decisions than legislative acts. In fact, in recent years, even the federal court has described itself as "a super board of education for every school district in the nation," [2] "a national theology board," [3] and amateur psychologists on a "psycho-journey." [4] Judges now endorse the declaration of Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Cardozo that:

I take judge-made law as one of the existing realities of life. [5]

As a result, there are now two constitutions for most states: the ratified constitution with its explicitly written language, and the unratified living constitution that evolves from decision to decision (or, as explained by Supreme Court Chief-Justice Charles Evans Hughes: "We are under a Constitution - but the Constitution is what the judges say it is." [6] ) And unfortunately, just as there are now two constitutions, there are also now two public policy-making bodies: the elected legislature and the appointed judiciary.

With two such radically different constitutions and distinctively different public policy bodies, citizens should have the choice of the constitution and public policies under which they must live. Otherwise (as Samuel Adams wisely observed):

[I]f the public are bound to yield obedience to [policies] to which they cannot give their approbation, they are slaves to those who make such laws and enforce them. [7]

While defenders of an activist judiciary often assert that an independent appointed judiciary does not hold political views, such claims are specious and are not confirmed by contemporary experience. As Thomas Jefferson long ago observed, it is naïve to assume that judges do not have political views on most issues before them:

Our judges are as honest as other men and not more so. They have, with others, the same passions for party, for power, and the privilege of their corps. . . . and their power the more dangerous as they are in office for life and not responsible - as the other functionaries are - to the elective control. [8]

Recent months have provided numerous examples of the people expressing a clear will on an issue and the judiciary then abrogating that will.

Most recently, a state judge struck down California's Prop 22 (enacted in 2000) declaring that marriage is only between a man and a woman. That judge unilaterally took the definition of marriage out of the hands of the people and substituted his own - as did judges in Hawaii, Vermont, and Massachusetts.

In Kansas, the legislature recently passed a death penalty statute at the behest of the people but the state supreme court struck it down, chiding both the legislature and the people. And despite the constitutional requirement that all spending originate and reside solely in the legislature, the court ordered additional spending on education lest the court take control of educational funding.

And in Nevada, even though the state constitution requires a 2/3rds majority of the legislature to increase taxes, its supreme court ordered that clause to be ignored and instead directed a tax increase to boost spending on education. Unbelievably, the state court ruled that part of the state constitution was unconstitutional!

Then in New Jersey, a 2002 candidate for U. S. Senate fell far behind in the polls; with 35 days left before the election, that candidate withdrew his name from the ballot. His party sought to place a new name on the ballot but State law stipulated that a candidate's name could be replaced only if the "vacancy shall occur not later than the 51st day before the general election." Despite the clear wording of the law, the appointed court ordered a new name to be placed on the ballot. That candidate surged in the polls and because the court ignored the law in order to advance a political agenda and gives one party two choices rather than one, his party won a U. S. Senate seat they were destined to lose.

And recall the Florida Supreme Court in the 2000 presidential election? State law explicitly declared that all election vote tallies were to be submitted to the Secretary of State's office by 5 PM on the 7th day following the election, and that results turned in past that time were to be ignored; yet those judges ruled that 5 PM on the 7th day really meant 5 PM on the 19th day, and that the word "ignored" really meant just the opposite - that the Secretary of State must accept all results, even those that did not comply with the law.

There are many other similar examples demonstrating that in States with an appointed judiciary, judges are quite comfortable in exerting political influence rather than simply upholding and applying State laws.

Given the growing proclivities now evident throughout appointed judiciaries, it is time for States with appointed judges to move toward elected judges - as Texas, New York, Louisiana, Pennsylvania, Alabama and more than half the States already have. And any argument that what occurred in New Jersey, California, Nevada, et. al, will not occur in other States ignores the fact that the current trend is not the result of demographics; rather, it is the result of what has been taught in law schools in recent decades. Consequently, the instances of judges acting as super-legislators will continue to increase.

The election of judges can now help preserve America's two fundamental government principles: government by "the consent of the governed," as authorized and approved by "We the people." Additionally, there are three fundamental historic principles that further buttress the current efforts to move toward elected judges.

Principle #1: Under American Government as Originally Established, the People are Ultimately in Charge of All Three Branches

The same Framers who established the three separate branches also established the principle that none of the branches was to be beyond the reach of the people. For example, the early State constitutions written by those who also framed the national government contain declarations such as:

All power residing originally in the people and being derived from them, the several magistrates and officers of government vested with authority - whether legislative, executive, or judicial - are their substitutes and agents and are at all times accountable to them [the people]. (emphasis added) [9]

Thomas Jefferson reiterated this important principle on numerous occasions. For example, when setting forth to the French the most important aspects of American government, he explained:

We think, in America, that it is necessary to introduce the people into every department of government. . . . Were I called upon to decide whether the people had best be omitted in the legislative or judiciary department, I would say it is better to leave them out of the legislative. The execution of the laws is more important than the making them. [10]

Since judges often have the final word, it is important that the people have a voice in that branch. In fact, if the "execution of the laws" by the judiciary regularly counters the will of the legislature (and thus uncorrectable by the people), then citizens will lose respect for government. As Luther Martin accurately warned at the Constitutional Convention:

It is necessary that the supreme judiciary should have the confidence of the people. This will soon be lost if they are employed in the task of remonstrating against [opposing and striking down] popular measures of the legislature. [11]

Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story (a "Father of American Jurisprudence," appointed to the Court by James Madison) further warned that an unaccountable judiciary would create a general dislike and distrust of the judiciary by the citizenry:

[An] accumulation of power in the judicial department would not only furnish pretexts for [complaint] against it but might create a general dread of its influence. [12]

It is an established principle of American government that the judiciary is to be accountable to the people, and judicial elections safeguard this principle.

Principle #2: The Independence of the Judiciary is Not Violated by the Election of Judges

Today, the term "independent" as applied to the judiciary has largely become a euphemism for "unaccountable"; and not surprisingly, many judges, when given increased levels of protection from the public, feel freer to advance personal agendas. Thomas Jefferson wisely observed that no official was to be so "independent" as to be beyond the reach of the people:

It should be remembered as an axiom of eternal truth in politics that whatever power in any government is independent is absolute also; in theory only, at first, while the spirit of the people is up, but in practice as fast as that relaxes. Independence can be trusted nowhere but with the people in mass. [13]

Only the people - and not the judiciary - can be safely trusted with complete independence. The term "independent" as currently used in relation to the judiciary is incorrectly applied - as pointed out by William Giles (1762-1830), a member of the first federal Congress:

With respect to the word "independent" as applicable to the Judiciary, it is not correct nor justified by the Constitution. This term is borrowed from Great Britain - and by some incorrect apprehension of its meaning there - . . . is applied here. [14]

In fact, when some clamored that the judiciary should be "independent," judge and U. S. Rep. Joseph Nicholson (1770-1817) forcefully reminded them:

By what authority are the judges to be raised above the law and above the Constitution? Where is the charter which places the sovereignty of this country in their hands? Give them the powers and the independence now contended for and they will require nothing more, for your government becomes a despotism and they become your rulers. They are to decide upon the lives, the liberties, and the property of your citizens; they have an absolute veto upon your laws by declaring them null and void at pleasure; they are to introduce at will the laws of a foreign country, differing essentially with us upon the great principles of government; and after being clothed with this arbitrary power, they are beyond the control of the nation, as they are not to be affected by any laws which the people by their representatives can pass. If all this be true - if this doctrine be established in the extent which is now contended for - the Constitution is not worth the time we are now spending on it. It is, as its enemies have called it, mere parchment. For these judges, thus rendered omnipotent, may overleap the Constitution and trample on your laws; they may laugh the legislature to scorn and set the nation at defiance. [15]

The notion of independence as now applied to the judiciary was repugnant to the Framers of American government - as confirmed by Constitution signer John Dickinson:

What innumerable acts of injustice may be committed, and how fatally may the principles of liberty be sapped, by a succession of judges utterly independent of the people? [16]

In short, the modern notions of judicial independence are glaringly absent from the constitutional organization of the branches. No branch is to be unaccountable to the people, and judicial elections ensure accountability.

Principle #3: The Judiciary is to be Accountable to the People, and Election of Judges Currently Accomplishes what Impeachment Did During the First Century of American Government

Originally, every appointed judge was made accountable to the people through impeachment; and literally dozens of impeachment proceedings were conducted during the first century of the nation. [17] Judges were removed from the bench for everything from cursing in the courtroom to rudeness to witnesses, from drunkenness in private life to any other conduct or behavior that was unacceptable to the public at large. (Only in the past half century has the level for an impeachable offense been erroneously redefined to be the commission of a major felony; with this incorrect standard, the people's ability to hold judges accountable has been greatly diminished.) The election of judges will now ensure a level of judicial accountability that impeachments once provided. It is instructive to examine the original grounds for removal of judges through impeachment and to note that these would be the very same grounds used today for removal of judges through elections.

What were the offenses that allowed for the removal of judges during America's early years? According to Justice Joseph Story, those offenses included "political offenses growing out of personal misconduct, or gross neglect, or usurpation, or habitual disregard of the public interests." [18] And Alexander Hamilton explained that judges could be removed for "the abuse or violation of some public trust. . . . [or for] injuries done immediately to the society itself." [19] Constitutional Convention delegate Elbridge Gerry considered "mal-administration" [20] as grounds for a judge's removal, and early constitutional scholar William Rawle also included "the inordinate extension of power, the influence of party and of prejudice" [21] as well as attempts to "infringe the rights of the people." [22] Very simply, judges could be removed whenever they disregarded public interests, affronted the will of the people, or introduced arbitrary power by seizing the role of policy-maker.

But would not a system of judicial elections be unfair to judges, or become a deterrent to good judges serving? Certainly not. As explained by Justice Story:

If he [a judge] should choose to accept office, he would voluntarily incur all the additional responsibility growing out of it. If [removed] for his conduct while in office, he could not justly complain since he was placed in that predicament by his own choice; and in accepting office he submitted to all the consequences. [23]

In fact, rather than keeping good judges from serving, the election of judges would do just the opposite: it would will help remove the most incompetent from office and - in the words of John Randolph Tucker (a constitutional law professor and early president of the American Bar Association) - it would "protect the government from the present or future incumbency of a man whose conduct has proved him unworthy to fill it." [24]

Very simply, judicial elections guard the principle of judicial accountability set forth by Justice James Iredell (placed on the U. S. Supreme Court by George Washington), who asserted:

Every man ought to be amenable for his conduct. . . . It will be not only the means of punishing misconduct but it will prevent misconduct. A man in public office who knows that there is no tribunal to punish him may be ready to deviate from his duty; but if he knows there is a tribunal for that purpose, although he may be a man of no principle, the very terror of punishment will perhaps deter him. [25]

Election of judges is nothing more than a tool to protect the rights of the people collectively. It once again makes the judiciary an accountable branch (as was originally intended), holding individual judges responsible for their decisions and thus preventing their usurping, misusing, or abusing power.

Summary

In this day of rampant judicial agendas, proposals that judges should be protected from citizens are untenable. History is too instructive on the necessity of direct judicial accountability for its lessons to be ignored today; and while judicial accountability through the use of impeachment on the federal level appears to be a thing of the past, judicial accountability through the direct election of State judges should not be. Elected judges should know that if they make agenda-driven decisions, they not only may face a plethora of opponents in their next race who will remind voters of their demonstrated contempt for State law but they will also have to face the voters themselves. Election of judges restores the original vision that:

All power residing originally in the people and being derived from them, the several magistrates and officers of government vested with authority - whether legislative, executive, or judicial - are their substitutes and agents and are at all times accountable to them [the people]. [26]


Endnotes

[1]Commonwealth v. Abner Kneeland, 37 Mass. (20 Pick) 206, 227, 232 (Sup. Ct. Mass. 1838).

[2]McCollum v. Board of Education; 333 U. S. 203, 237 (1948).

[3]County of Allegheny v. ACLU; 106 L. Ed. 2d 472, 550 (1989), Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

[4]Lee v. Weisman; 120 L. Ed. 2d 467, 516 (1992), Scalia, J., dissenting.

[5]Benjamin Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1921), p. 10.

[6]Charles Evans Hughes, The Autobiographical Notes of Charles Evans Hughes, David J. Danelski and Joseph S. Tulchin, editors (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973), p. 144, speech at Elmira on May 3, 1907.

[7]Boston Gazette, January 20, 1772, Samuel Adams writing as "Candidus."

[8]Thomas Jefferson, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson (Washington, D. C.: The Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association, 1904), Vol. XV, p. 277, to William Charles Jarvis on September 28, 1820.

[9]A Constitution or Frame of Government Agreed Upon by the Delegates of the People of the State of Massachusetts-Bay (Boston: Benjamin Edes & Sons, 1780), p. 9, Massachusetts, 1780, Part I, Article V.

[10]Jefferson, Writings, Vol. VII, pp. 422-423, to M. L'Abbe Arnoud on July 19, 1789.

[11]James Madison, The Papers of James Madison, Henry D. Gilpin, editor (Washington: Langtree & O'Sullivan, 1840), Vol. II, pp. 1161-1171, Luther Martin at the Constitutional Convention on July 21, 1787.

[12]Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (Boston: Hilliard, Gray, and Company, 1833), Vol. II, p. 233, § 760.

[13]Jefferson, Writings, Vol. XV, pp. 213-214, to Judge Spencer Roane on September 6, 1819.

[14]Charles S. Hyneman and George W. Carey, A Second Federalist (1967) supra note 91 at 183-84 (quoting Senator William Giles.

[15]Debates In the Congress of the United States on the Bill for Repealing The Law For the More Convenient Organization of the Courts of the United States; During the First Session of the Seventh Congress (Albany: Collier and Stockwell, 1802), pp. 658-659.

[16]Empire and Nation, Forrest McDonald, editor (Indianapolis, Liberty Fund, 1999), John Dickinson, Letters From a Farmer in Pennsylvania, Letter IX, p.53.

[17]David Barton, Restraining Judicial Activism (Aledo: WallBuilder Press, 2003), p. 10, n. 25, 26.

[18]Story, Commentaries, Vol. II, pp. 233-234, § 762.

[19]The Federalist Papers, #65 by Alexander Hamilton.

[20]Madison, Papers, Vol. III, p. 1528, Elbridge Gerry at the Constitutional Convention on Saturday, September 8, 1787.

[21]William Rawle, A View of the Constitution of the United States of America (Philadelphia: Philip H. Nicklin, 1829), p. 211.

[22]Rawle, View of the Constitution, p. 210.

[23]Story, Commentaries, Vol. II, pp. 256-257, § 788.

[24]John Randolph Tucker, The Constitution of the United States: A Critical Discussion of its Genesis, Development, and Interpretation, Henry St. George Tucker, editor (Chicago: Callaghan & Co., 1899), Vol. I, pp. 411-412, § 199 (f ), p. 415, § 199 (o).

[25]Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, Jonathan Elliot, editor (Washington: Printed for the Editor, 1836), Vol. IV, p. 32, James Iredell at North Carolina's Ratification Convention on July 24, 1788.

[26]A Constitution . . . of Massachusetts-Bay, p. 9, Massachusetts, 1780, Part I, Article V.



This post and the post above is from Wall Builders.

Five Judicial Myths

Five Judicial Myths David Barton - 02/2008 Five Judicial Myths

Talking Points About the Judiciary

Despite what we hear today . . .

1. THE JUDICIARY IS NOT A CO-EQUAL BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT

A. Federalist #51: “the legislative authority necessarily predominates.1
B. Federalist #78: “The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither force nor will. . . . The judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution. . . . [T]he judiciary is, beyond comparison, the weakest of the three departments of power. . . . [and] the general liberty of the people can never be endangered from that quarter.2
C. Congress determines the operation of the Judiciary, not vice versa (Congress sets the number of judges and courts; what issues may come before the courts; judges’ salary and compensation; how often the courts meet and the length of their sessions; and just as Congress can establish and set the number of lowers courts, so, too, can Congress also abolish them; etc.)
D. Robert Wright, officer in the Revolution, Maryland judge, early U. S. Senator: “[C]ongress can establish legislatively a court, and thereby create a judge; so they can legislatively abolish the court and eventually annihilate the officer…the inferior courts are creatures of the legislature, and that the creature must always be in the power of the creator – that he who createth can destroy.3
E. William Giles, member of the first federal Congress under the Constitution: “Is that [the Judiciary department] formed by the Constitution? It is not…It is only declared that there shall be such a department, and it is directed to be formed by the two other departments, who owe a responsibility to the people….The number of judges, the assignation of duties, the fixing of compensations, the fixing the times when, and the places where, the courts shall exercise the functions, &c., are left to the entire discretion of Congress. The spirit as well as the words of the Constitution are completely satisfied, provided one Supreme Court be established….Congress may postpone the sessions of the courts for eight or ten years, and establish others to whom they could transfer all the powers of the existing courts.4
F. As Rep. Steve King correctly explains, “Constitutionally, Congress can reduce the Supreme Court to nothing more than Chief Justice Roberts sitting at a card table with a candle” – a power that the Judiciary cannot reciprocally exercise over Congress.

2. THE JUDICIARY IS NOT TO BE AN INDEPENDENT BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT

A. John Dickinson, signer of the Constitution: “[W]hat innumerable acts of injustice may be committed – and how fatally may the principles of liberty be sapped – by a succession of judges utterly independent of the people?5
B. Thomas Jefferson: “It should be remembered as an axiom of eternal truth in politics that whatever power in any government is independent is absolute also; in theory only, at first, while the spirit of the people is up, but in practice as fast as that relaxes. Independence can be trusted nowhere but with the people in mass.6
C. Nathaniel Chipman, office in the Revolution, early Member of Congress, U. S. federal judge, Chief Justice of Vermont Supreme Court: “If the judges are made thus independent . . . they will become a dangerous body.7
D. Jonathan Mason, law student trained by John Adams and an early Member of Congress: “The independence of the judiciary so much desired will – if tolerated – soon become something like supremacy. They will, indeed, form the main pillar of this goodly fabric; they will soon become the only remaining pillar, and they will presently be so strong as to crush and absorb the others into their solid mass.8
E. Thomas Jefferson: “We think, in America, that it is necessary to introduce the people into every department of government. . . Were I called upon to decide whether the people had best be omitted in the legislative or judiciary department, I would say it is better to leave them out of the legislative. The execution of the laws is more important than the making them.9
F. Joseph Nicholson, early Member of Congress, successfully managed the impeachment of multiple early federal judges: “Give [judges] the powers and the independence now contended for and . . . your government becomes a despotism and they become your rulers. They are to decide upon the lives, the liberties, and the property of your citizens; they have an absolute veto upon your laws by declaring them null and void at pleasure; they are to introduce at will the laws of a foreign country…after being clothed with this arbitrary power, they are beyond the control of the nation. . . . If all this be true – if this doctrine be established in the extent which is now contended for – the Constitution is not worth the time we are now spending on it. It is – as it has been called by its enemies – mere parchment. For these judges, thus rendered omnipotent, may overleap the Constitution and trample on your laws.10

3. THE JUDICIARY IS NOT THE SOLE BRANCH CAPABLE OF DETERMINING CONSTITUTIONALITY

A. James Madison: “But the great objection . . . is that the Legislature itself has no right to expound the Constitution – that wherever its meaning is doubtful, you must leave it to take its course until the Judiciary is called upon the declare its meaning. . . . I beg to know upon what principle it can be contended that any one department draws from the Constitution greater powers than another in marking out the limits.11
B. Elbridge Gerry, signer of the Declaration and a framer of the Bill of Rights: “It was quite foreign from the nature of [the judiciary’s] office to make them judges of the policy of public measures.12
C. Luther Martin, framer of the Constitution and Attorney General of Maryland: “A knowledge of mankind and of legislative affairs cannot be presumed to belong in a higher degree to the Judges than to the Legislature.13
D. John Randolph of Roanoke: “[I]f you pass the law, the judges are to put their veto upon it by declaring it unconstitutional. Here is a new power of a dangerous and uncontrollable nature contended for…The power which has the right of passing – without appeal – on the validity of laws is your sovereign.14
E. Thomas Jefferson: “O]ur Constitution. . . . has given – according to this opinion – to one of [the three Branches] alone the right to prescribe rules for the government of the others – and to that one, too, which is unelected by and independent of the nation. . . . The Constitution, on this hypothesis, is a mere thing of wax in the hands of the Judiciary which they may twist and shape into any form they please.15
F. Rufus King, signer of the Constitution, framer of the Bill of Rights: “The judges must interpret the laws; they ought not to be legislators.16
G. John Randolph of Roanoke: “The decision of a constitutional question must rest somewhere. Shall it be confided to men immediately responsible to the people – the Congress, or to those who are irresponsible…the judges?....[a]re we [Congress] not as deeply interested in the true exposition of the Constitution as the judges can be? With all the deference to their talents, is not Congress as capable of forming a correct opinion as they are? Are not its members acting under a responsibility to public opinion which can, and will, check their aberrations from duty?17
H. Thomas Jefferson: “[T]he opinion which gives to the judges the right to decide what laws are constitutional and what not, not only for themselves in their own sphere of action, but for the Legislature and Executive also in their spheres, would make the Judiciary a despotic branch.18
I. James Madison: “[R]efusing or not refusing to execute a law, to stamp it with its final character. . . . makes the Judiciary department paramount in fact to the Legislature, which was never intended and can never be proper.19
J. Federalist #81: “[T]here is not a syllable in the plan [the Constitution] which directly empowers the national courts to construe the laws according to the spirit of the Constitution.20
K. Thomas Jefferson: “You seem . . . to consider the judges as the ultimate arbiters of all constitutional questions – a very dangerous doctrine indeed, and one which would place us under the despotism of an oligarchy. Our judges are as honest as other men and not more so. They have, with others, the same passions for party, for power, and the privilege of their corps. . . . [A]nd their power the more dangerous as they are in office for life and not responsible, as the other functionaries are, to the elective.21
L. President Andrew Jackson: “Each public officer who takes an oath to support the Constitution swears that he will support it as he understands it, and not as it is understood by others. . . . The authority of the Supreme Court must not, therefore, be permitted to control the Congress or the Executive.22
M. Abraham Lincoln: “I do not forget the position assumed by some that constitutional questions are to be decided by the Supreme Court. . . . At the same time, the candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the government upon vital questions affecting the whole people is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant they are made . . . the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having . . . resigned their government into the hands of that eminent tribunal.23

4. FEDERAL JUDGES DO NOT HOLD LIFETIME APPOINTMENTS

A. The Constitution says that judges hold their office only during “good behavior” (Art. III, Sec. 1).
B. Federal judges may be removed by Congress for misbehavior, which, historically, did not include only criminal behavior but also other misbehavior.
C. Historically, federal judges have been removed from the bench by Congress for contradicting an order of Congress, for profanity, for rude treatment of witness in a courtroom, for drunkenness, for judicial high-handedness and a variety of other reasons.24
D. The Constitution provides six clauses on impeachment – the most often-mentioned subject in the Constitution.25
E. The Founding Fathers and early legal authorities were clear about the ground for impeachment:
1. James Wilson, signer of the Constitution, original Justice on the U. S. Supreme Court: “[I]mpeachments are confined to political characters, to political crimes and misdemeanors, and to political punishments.26
2. Justice Joseph Story, a “Father of American Jurisprudence” appointed to the Supreme Court by President James Madison: “The offenses to which the power of impeachment has been and is ordinarily applied as a remedy. . . . are aptly termed political offences, growing out of personal misconduct, or gross neglect, or usurpation, or habitual disregard of the public interests.27
3. John Marshall, Chief Justice of the U. S. Supreme Court: “[T]he present doctrine seems to be that a Judge giving a legal opinion contrary to the opinion of the legislature is liable to impeachment.28
4. George Mason, the “Father of the Bill of Rights”: “attempts to subvert the Constitution.29
5. Alexander Hamilton: “the abuse or violation of some public trust. . . . [or for] injuries done immediately to the society itself.30
6. George Mason, “Father of the Bill of Rights,” and Elbridge, signer of the Declaration and Framer of the Bill of Rights: “mal-administration.31
7. William Rawle, legal authority and author of early constitutional commentary: “the inordinate extension of power, the influence of party and of prejudice32 as well as attempts to “infringe the rights of the people.33
8. Justice Joseph Story, a “Father of American Jurisprudence” appointed to the Supreme Court by President James Madison: “unconstitutional opinions” and “attempts to subvert the fundamental laws and introduce arbitrary power.34 F. Federalist #65: “[T]he practice of impeachments [is] a bridle in the hands of the Legislative body.35
G. Justice James Iredell, a ratifier of the Constitution, placed on the Supreme Court by President Washington: “Every government requires it [impeachment]. Every man ought to be amenable for his conduct. . . . It will be not only the means of punishing misconduct but it will prevent misconduct. A man in public office who knows that there is no tribunal to punish him may be ready to deviate from his duty; but if he knows there is a tribunal for that purpose although he may be a man of no principle, the very terror of punishment will perhaps deter him.36

5. THE PURPOSE OF THE SUPREME COURT IS NOT TO PROTECT THE MINORITY FROM THE MAJORITY, AND CONGRESS IS A BETTER PROTECTOR OF MINORITY RIGHTS THAN IS THE JUDICIARY

A. George Washington: “[T]he fundamental principle of our Constitution... enjoins [requires] that the will of the majority shall prevail.37
B. Thomas Jefferson: “[T]he will of the majority [is] the natural law of every society [and] is the only sure guardian of the rights of man. Perhaps even this may sometimes err. But its errors are honest, solitary and short-lived.38
C. The Judiciary is now regularly anti-majoritarian.
D. The primary purpose of the Supreme Court is not to protect the minority from the majority.
E. The primary purpose of the Bill of Rights is not to protect the minority from the majority; the purpose of the Bill of Rights is to protect every citizen, whether in the minority or the majority, from the intrusion upon their rights by government.
F. Congress is a better guardian of the people and the minority than are the courts.
G. Federalist #51: “The members of the Legislative department . . . are numerous. They are distributed and dwell among the people at large. Their connections of blood, of friendship, and of acquaintance embrace a great proportion of the most influential part of the society. . . . they are more immediately the confidential guardians of their rights and liberties.39
H. In 1875, Congress banned all segregation,40 but in 1882, the Supreme Court struck down that law.41 While the Court is often praised today for ending segregation in Brown v. Board of Education in 1954, what the Court actually did in that case was only to reverse its own position that had kept segregation alive 70 longer than Congress’ ban.
I. Thomas Jefferson: “When the Legislative or Executive functionaries act unconstitutionally, they are responsible to the people in their elective capacity. The exemption of the judges from that is quite dangerous enough. I know no safe depository of the ultimate powers of the society but the people themselves; and if we think them [the people] not enlightened enough to exercise their control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take it from them, but to inform their discretion by education. This is the true corrective of abuses of constitutional power.42

Endnotes

1. James Madison, John Jay & Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist (Philadelphia: Benjamin Warner, 1818), p. 281.(Return)

2. James Madison, John Jay & Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist (Philadelphia: Benjamin Warner, 1818), pp. 419-420.(Return)

3. The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United States (Washington: Gales & Seaton, 1851), Seventh Congress, 1st Session, p. 114, January 15, 1802.(Return)

4. The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United States (Washington: Gales & Seaton, 1851), Seventh Congress, 1st Session, pp. 585-586, 593, February 18, 1802.(Return)

5. John Dickinsonn, Leters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania, to the Inhabitants of the British Colonies (New York: The Outlook Company, 1903), p. 92, Letter IX.(Return)

6. The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Andrew A. Lipscomb, editor (Washington DC: The Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association, 1904), Vol. XV, p. 137, to Spencer Roane, September 6, 1819.(Return)

7. The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United States (Washington: Gales & Seaton, 1851), 7th Congress, 1st Session, p. 131, January 19, 1802.(Return)

8. The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United States (Washington: Gales & Seaton, 1851), 7th Congress, 1st Session, p. 63, January 13, 1802.(Return)

9. The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Julian P. Boyd, editor (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958), Vol. 15, p. 283, to the Abbe Arnoux, July 19, 1789.(Return)

10. The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United States (Washington: Gales & Seaton, 1851), Seventh Congress, 1st Session, pp. 823-824, February 27, 1802.(Return)

11. The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United States (Washington: Gales & Seaton, 1834), Vol. 1, First Congress, 1st Session, p. 520, June 17, 1789.(Return)

12. The Papers of James Madison, Henry D. Gilpin, editor (Washington: Langtree & O’Sullivan, 1840), Vol. II, p. 783, “Debates in the Federal Convention,” June 4, 1787.(Return)

13. The Papers of James Madison, Henry D. Gilpin, editor (Washington: Langtree & O’Sullivan, 1840), Vol. II, p. 1166, “Debates in the Federal Convention,” July 21, 1787.(Return)

14. The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United States (Washington: Gales & Seaton, 1851), Seventh Congress, 1st Session, p. 661, February 20, 1802.(Return)

15. The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Andrew A. Lipscomb, editor (Washington DC: The Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association, 1904), Vol. XV, p. 213, to Spencer Roane, September 6, 1819.(Return)

16. The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, Max Farrand, editor (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1911), Vol. I, p. 108, from Rufus King’s records of the Convention from Monday, June 4, 1787.(Return)

17. The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United States (Washington: Gales & Seaton, 1851), Seventh Congress, 1st Session, p. 661, February 20, 1802.(Return)

18. The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Andrew. A. Lipscomb, editor (Washington DC: The Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association, 1904), Vol. XI, p. 51, to Mrs. John Adams, September 11, 1804.(Return)

19. James Madison, Letters and Other Writings of James Madison (New York: R. Worthington, 1884), Vol. 1, p. 194, “Remarks on Mr. Jefferson’s Draught of a Constitution for Virginia,” October 1788.(Return)

20. James Madison, John Jay & Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist (Philadelphia: Benjamin Warner, 1818), p. 436.(Return)

21. Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Andrew A. Lipscomb, editor (Washington DC: The Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association, 1904), Vol. XV, p. 277, to William Charles Jarvis, September 28, 1820.(Return)

22. James D. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents (Published by Authority of Congress, 1899), Vol. III, p. 1145, “Veto Message,” July 10, 1832.(Return)

23. The Works of Abraham Lincoln, John H. Clifford, editor (New York: The University Society Inc., 1908), Vol. V, pp. 142-143, “First Inaugural Address,” March 4, 1861.(Return)

24. Congressional Record (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1933), Volume 76, pp. 4914-4916, Impeachment articles against Harold Louderback, district judge for northern California, February 24, 1933; Congressional Record (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1905), Vol. XXXIX, pp. 1281-1283, Impeachment articles against Charles Swayne, district judge for northern Florida, Junary 24, 1905; Congressional Record (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1912), Vol. XLVIII, pp. 9051-9053, Impeachment articles against Robert W. Archbald, third circuit judge, July 15, 1912; Congressional Record (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1926), Vol. LXVII, pp. 6585-6589, Impeachment articles against George W. English, district judge for eastern Illinois, March 30, 1926; Floyd Riddick, Procedure and Guidelines for Impeachment Trials in the United States Senate (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1974), pp. 10-13.(Return)

25. See The Constitution of the United States of America, available online at http://www.archives.gov/national-archives-experience/charters/constitution.html; Impeachment is mentioned in the following clauses: Article I, Section 2 and Section 3, Article II, Section 2 and Section 4, Article III, Section 2.(Return)

26. The Works of the Honorable James Wilson, Bird Wilson, editor (Philadelphia: Bronson and Chauncey, 1804), Vol. II, p. 166, “Of the Constitution of the United States and of Pennsylvania—of the Legislative Department.”(Return)

27. Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (Boston: Hilliard, Gray & Co, 1833), Vol. II, pp. 233-234, Sec. 762.(Return)

28. The Papers of John Marshall, Charles F. Hobson, editor (Chapel Hill, VA: The University of North Carolina Press, 1990), Vol. VI, p. 347, to Samuel Chase, January 23, 1805.(Return)

29. The Papers of James Madison, Henry D. Gilpin, editor (Washington: Langtree & O’Sullivan, 1840), Vol. III, p. 1528, “Debates in the Federal Convention, 1787.”(Return)

30. James Madison, John Jay & Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist (Philadelphia: Benjamin Warner, 1818), p. 352.(Return)

31. The Papers of James Madison, Henry D. Gilpin, editor (Washington: Langtree & O’Sullivan, 1840), Vol. III, p. 1528, “Debates in the Federal Convention, 1787.”(Return)

32. William Rawle, A View of the Constitution of the United States of America (Philadelphia: Philip H. Nicklin, 1829), p. 211.(Return)

33. William Rawle, A View of the Constitution of the United States of America (Philadelphia: Philip H. Nicklin, 1829), p. 210.(Return)

34. Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (Boston: Hilliard, Gray & Co, 1833), Vol. II, p. 268,(Return)

35. James Madison, John Jay & Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist (Philadelphia: Benjamin Warner, 1818), p. 353,(Return)

36. The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, as Recommended by the General Convention at Philadelphia in 1787, Jonathan Elliot, editor (Washington: Printed for the Editor, 1836), Vol. IV, p. 32, July 24, 1788.(Return)

37. James D. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897 (Published by Authority of Congress, 1899), Vol. I, p. 156, from the "Sixth Annual Address" of November 19, 1794.(Return)

38. The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Julian P. Boyd, editor (NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961), Vol. XVI, p. 179, “Response to the Citizens of Albermarle,” February 12, 1790.(Return)

39. James Madison, John Jay & Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist (Philadelphia: Benjamin Warner, 1818), p. 275.(Return)

40. The Statutes at Large (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1875), Vol. XVIII, Part 3, pp. 335-337, “An Act to protect all citizens in their civil and legal rights,” March 1, 1875.(Return)

41. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).(Return)

42. The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Andrew A. Lipscomb, editor (Washington, DC: The Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association, 1904), Vol. XV, p. 278, to William Charles Jarvis, September 28, 1820.(Return)


[this is good]

Twana your posted comments on the Judiciary explains in more exact terms than I could that the American Judiciary has run Amok and currently operates extra-Constitutionally beyond the limits and intent of the U.S. Constitution.

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